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In this paper, we apply a modified version of the Mishkin (1983) test to companies in 
the UK stock market in order to investigate the presence of accruals and cash flow 
effects on UK firms’ annual returns. First, we find that accruals decile rankings have U-
shaped, or inverted U-shaped, or no relationships with most of the risk variables. 
Accruals decile rankings have, however, a negative relationship with the ratio of 
research and development to market value which is known to have a positive 
relationship with returns. Second, regarding the relationship between risk controls and 
returns, we find evidence associated with an RD effect and some evidence in favour of 
earnings-price and past return effects. We find little evidence of firm size, book to-
market, and firm leverage effects, once the other variables are controlled for. Third, for 
the period 1990-2007, we report little evidence of general accruals mispricing in the UK 
in which accruals have a negative relationship with future returns, once risk has been 
accounted for. Additionally, after treatment of extreme observations, evidence of cash 
flow mispricing is found for the UK stock market. An alternative interpretation of our 
results is that there is no separate accruals effect, at least in the way predicted by the 
conventional mispricing stories, once other effects are taken into account, but there is a 








Since being reported by Sloan (1996), the accruals anomaly in the USA has attracted the 
attention of researchers trying to better understand it.   Simply put, based on a sample of 
firms listed on the NYSE and AMEX, and a specific application of the Mishkin (1983) 
test, Sloan (1996) reports that US investors seem unable to correctly understand the 
persistence of the different components of reported earnings.  Put another way, US 
investors, in the aggregate, are irrational forecasters.  In particular, when forecasting 
next period earnings, such investors over-weight the accruals component, and under-
weight the cash flow component, of earnings.  Consequently, firms that have relatively 
high (low) accruals are found to have higher (lower) earnings forecast than is rational. 
This leads to accruals being negatively associated with returns. It is this irrational 
forecasting that is thought of as the accruals anomaly.   
 
Sloan (1996) then hypothesises that it could be possible to take advantage of the 
identified inefficient forecasts and implement an investment strategy that yields 
abnormal returns.  Such a strategy involves going long on low accruals firms and short 
on high accruals firms, with the original results in Sloan (1996) estimating a size-
adjusted, one year-ahead, abnormal return of 10.4%.   
 
Following the initial results by Sloan (1996), researchers have explored various aspects 
of the accruals anomaly on US data.
2  One particular line of questioning is concerned 
with how the Mishkin (1983) test is applied in Sloan (1996).  The conventional way in 
                                                 
2   See Soares and Stark (2009) for a summary of various other lines of questionning explored with 
respect to the accruals anomaly and its implications.  
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which the Mishkin (1983) test has been applied in investigating the accruals anomaly is 
to posit two equations – the first a linear forecasting equation in which earnings are 
forecast using accruals and cash flows as the forecasting variables, the second an 
abnormal returns equation in which abnormal returns are solely a function of 
unexpected earnings.  The two equations are simultaneously estimated and 
inconsistencies between the two tested for.   
 
Kraft et al. (2007) raise a number of issues concerning this application of the Mishkin 
(1983) test in Sloan (1996).  First, they point out that the two-stage estimation process 
requires that the sample of firms used has a potential survivorship bias built into it as a 
consequence of a requirement for next year’s earnings to be available and, hence, that 
the firm has survived for a further year in order for it to enter into the sample for any 
given year.  Second, but still operating within the two equation structure identified 
above, they argue that the two-stage version of the Mishkin (1983) test is particularly 
sensitive to the presence of omitted variables in the earnings forecasting equation that 
are themselves mis-priced when attempting to draw inferences about specific 
components of earnings (e.g., accruals and cash flows).  Third, they suggest that an 
alternative version of the Mishkin (1983) test, based upon the form put forward by Abel 
and Mishkin (1983) involving the estimation of only a single equation in which 
abnormal returns are expressed as a function of earnings forecasting variables 
(including accruals and cash flows, but also other variables thought to be useful in 
forecasting earnings), is equally as appropriate as the two-stage process.  Here, the null 
hypothesis is that the forecasting variables should have no explanatory power if pricing 
is rational.  This approach can deal with the omitted variables problem more easily than  
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the two-stage process, and also does not require that one period-ahead earnings are 
known for a firm to enter into the estimation sample.   
 
As mentioned above, Kraft et al. (2007) still assume that, even in the presence of a 
number of different earnings forecasting variables, abnormal returns can safely be 
modelled only as a function of unexpected profits.  As a consequence, they still assume 
that only a single forecasting equation - that for earnings - is relevant for identifying 
forecasting irrationality and a significant coefficient for any forecasting variable in 
explaining one period-ahead abnormal returns implies that its true weight in forecasting 
earnings is misunderstood by market participants.  The specific form of forecasting 
irrationality then can be identified.  
 
Pope (2001) provides another line of criticism of the Mishkin (1983) methodology 
within the two-stage framework, however.  He points out that if accruals and cash flows 
have different forecasting implications for one-year-ahead earnings, modelling 
abnormal returns as a function of unexpected earnings alone potentially results in a mis-
specification problem caused by omitted variables.  Specifically, abnormal returns 
should be modelled as a function of unexpected accruals and unexpected cash flows.  
This has two implications.  First, there ought to be two forecasting equations estimated 
– one for accruals and one for cash flows.  Second, treating unexpected earnings as the 
only independent variable will result in a correlated omitted variable that could render 
inferences problematic.
3    
                                                 
3   Francis and Smith (2005) find that firm-specific estimates of the persistence of accruals and cash 
flows in forecasting next period’s income from continuing operations are approximately equal, in 
contrast to the cross-sectional estimates used in implementing the Mishkin (1983) test in Sloan 




With respect to Kraft et al. (2007), the basic structure of analysis of Pope (2001) 
suggests two problems.  First, abnormal returns ought to be modelled as a function of all 
the unexpected components of the earnings forecasting variables.  Second, forecasting 
equations for each of the forecasting variables need to be modelled.  The first 
contribution of the paper is to describe a single-stage Mishkin (1983) test that 
incorporates these features, together with identifying the inferences that can be drawn 
from the test.  The single-stage test essentially follows the same form as that in Kraft et 
al. (2007).  Nonetheless, we observe that although pricing irrationality implies 
forecasting irrationality, the converse is not true.  Further, pricing irrationality does not 
enable any specific form of forecasting irrationality to be identified.   
 
A second form of problem with applying our Mishkin (1983) test is the measurement of 
abnormal returns.  Such a task requires the specification of an asset pricing model or, 
more generally, a risk control approach (this issue also arises when the profitability of 
accruals-based trading strategies are investigated).  Three approaches seem possible.  
First, an asset pricing model could be specified, the parameters of which can be 
estimated from historical data in order to estimate a ‘normal’ return against which the 
actual return can be benchmarked.  Nonetheless, in the UK in particular, it is not clear 
which asset pricing model is appropriate.  For example, Michou et al. (2010) suggest 
that neither the capital asset pricing model nor versions of the Fama-French (1993) three 
                                                                                                                                               
context of investigating the presence of an accruals anomaly as a consequence of the use of cross-
sectional estimates of the income forecasting equation.  
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factor model are well-specified on UK data. Further, Gregory et al. (2009) question the 
efficacy of expanding the three factor model to include a momentum factor.
4 
 
Second, individual firm returns can be matched with the return on a benchmark 
portfolio formed on the basis of firm characteristics thought to capture risk.  Such an 
approach has been popular in the US, where size-matched abnormal returns have often 
been estimated in the context of tests of the accruals anomaly.  The difficulty with this 
approach is that, in the UK in particular, it is difficult to match on any more than two 
risk characteristics, because of the number of listed firms, whereas evidence suggests 
that there are more than two characteristics with the potential to capture risk (for 
example, Al-Horani et al., 2003, and Dedman et al., 2009, suggest that the ratio of 
research and development expenditures to market value is the single strongest 
explanatory variable of returns when size, book-to-market, and the ratio are compared 
and prior research also suggests that returns are related to the earnings-price ratio, past 
returns, and leverage). 
 
Third, individual firm returns can be regressed on firm characteristics known to be 
associated with the cross-section of returns (e.g., size, book-to-market, past returns, 
etc.), together with accruals and cash flows (e.g., Pincus et al., 2007).  Essentially, this 
moves the expected return component of the dependent variable in the Mishkin (1983) 
test to the right hand side of the equation.   
                                                 
4   Khan (2008) questions whether the approaches used to control for risk in assessing the returns to 
accruals-based portfolio strategies in the US are effective.  He provides evidence that the risk 
models normally used by previous studies might not be complete in correctly capturing risk, with 
insignificant abnormal returns for accruals-based hedge portfolios being reported when using an 
extended model of asset pricing which includes the Fama and French (1993) factors, and two 
additional factors (based on dividends on the market portfolio, and news about the future expected 




Such an approach can be interpreted in more than one way, however.  If there are 
rational reasons why the firm characteristics should capture risk, the regression 
approach allows an expanded approach to capturing risk.  Alternatively, if it is not clear 
why, from a theoretical perspective, the chosen firm characteristics capture risk, the 
regression approach has the potential to identify whether one anomaly (e.g., the accruals 
anomaly) is distinct from other anomalies (e.g., the size anomaly).  
 
Finally, using US data, Kothari et al. (2005) find that the Mishkin (1983) test is 
sensitive to the treatment of extreme observations.   For example, Pincus et al. (2007) 
winsorise their data to protect their inferences from the contaminatory effects of 
extreme observations.   Further, Kraft et al. (2006) report that only the highest accruals 
decile is found to be mispriced when excluding a set of extreme observations.   
  
Given that the accruals anomaly is initially argued to be a product of irrationality by 
investors operating in the US market, it becomes an interesting issue as to whether 
investors operating in other well-established stock markets suffer from similar 
irrationalities.  After all, it is not clear that, for example, educational and training 
backgrounds, which might give rise to forms of irrationalities in a particular set of 
investors, are common to sets of investors operating in different countries and stock 
markets.  As a consequence, it is perhaps surprising that, internationally, the evidence 
on the accruals anomaly is limited.   
 
According to LaFond (2005), the accruals anomaly is found in several countries and is 
mainly driven by working capital accruals.  Pincus et al. (2007) survey twenty countries  
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and report that the accruals anomaly is concentrated in those countries characterized by 
the extensive use of accruals accounting, widespread share ownership and whose legal 
system is based on common law.  More specifically, the accruals anomaly is only found 
in the US, UK, Canada and Australia while, in the rest of the countries, no anomaly is 
detected.  However, Leippold and Lohre (2008) raise concerns about the testing 
procedures used by LaFond (2005) and Pincus et al. (2007) when multiple testing is 
employed.  Using a sample of 29 countries for the years of 1994 to 2007, Leippold and 
Lohre (2008) provide evidence that partial results from previous studies might be driven 
by errors in data and testing procedures that, once corrected, only detect accruals mis-
pricing for the US.   
 
Kaserer and Klinger (2008) report evidence that the accruals anomaly is found for 
German companies that adopted IFRS early, but no evidence of such an anomaly is 
found for those firms that kept using German GAAP.  Based on a UK sample spanning 
the years of 1986-2005, Chan et al. (2009) provide evidence that changes in the 
regulatory framework aimed to improving the quality of financial information, lead to a 
reduction of in the extent of the accruals anomaly of companies with poor accounting 
quality information.  Finally, Soares and Stark (2009) find evidence in the UK of 
abnormal returns predictability based upon accruals rankings, but a hedge strategy is not 
profitable when implementable investment strategies and transaction costs are 
considered.
5  Overall, while some evidence of the accruals anomaly is found in 
countries other than the US, it is not clear how consistent or robust it is.   
 
                                                 
5   Pincus  et al. (2007) also suggest that accruals mispricing is not exploitable in the UK once 
transactions costs are taken into account.  Unlike Soares and Stark (2009), they do not estimate 
transactions costs directly, however.  
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In this paper we extend both international evidence, and evidence specifically in the 
UK, as a well-established stock market, on the accruals anomaly.  As a consequence, we 
focus on the use of Mishkin (1983) tests and the identification of general forecasting 
irrationalities.  We initially develop an adaptation of the Kraft et al. (2007) version of 
the Mishkin (1983) test that takes into account the Pope (2001) critique.  This test also 
allows us to incorporate other information variables that are thought to predict earnings 
(at least in the USA).  We then incorporate a greater number of risk controls than used 
in prior UK work (and elsewhere).  Further, we investigate the impact of extreme 
observations on our analyses. On applying this version of the Mishkin (1983) test, we 
conclude that there is little evidence of an accruals anomaly, in the sense identified 
above, whether using raw or winsorised data.  Evidence of a cash flow effect is found, 
with returns generally increasing in cash flow, when winsorised data are used.   
 
We follow up this evidence by extending the regressions outside the framework of the 
Mishkin (1983) test by first substituting a set of dummy variables capturing the decile 
rank of the accruals variable for the underlying accruals variable, leaving the other 
variables unchanged.
6  This allows the relationship between accruals and risk-adjusted 
returns to be both non-linear and non-monotonic.  Second, we substitute a set of dummy 
variables capturing the decile rank of the cash flow variable for the underlying cash 
flow variable, again leaving the other variables unchanged.  This allows the relationship 
between cash flows and risk-adjusted returns to be both non-linear and non-monotonic.  
We find that the relationship between accruals rankings and risk-adjusted returns is 
generally negative if extreme observations are left unaltered in the dataset.  If 
                                                 
6    It is outside the framework of the Mishkin (1983) test in the sense that there is no explicit 
forecasting model built into this test.  It is within the general spirit of the Mishkin (1983) test, 
however, because that test disallows the property that past accounting data, or transformations of 
that data, can predict future abnormal returns.  
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winsorised data are used, there is little evidence of any accruals anomaly.  For cash 
flows, the results, whilst not being fully monotonic, suggest that there is a general trend 
for risk-adjusted returns to increase with cash flow rank.  This is particularly significant 
if winsorised data are used.  
 
Overall, there is little evidence for any accruals anomaly in which returns decline as 
accruals increase, once an extended set of risk controls are taken into account, and the 
influence of extreme observations is reduced.  In fact, there is stronger evidence 
suggesting that there is a cash flow effect in annual returns.  As indicated above, 
however, an alternative interpretation is that the accruals effect is not a separate effect, 
once the effects of other variables considered to predict future returns are taken into 
account, whereas the cash flow effect is separate.   
 
This paper is organized into four subsequent additional sections.  Section 2 provides the 
development of the Mishkin (1983) tests, and details of the regressions estimated.   
Section 3 presents details of the sample used in the paper, and the empirical definitions 
of the various variables used in the various analyses.  Section 4 reports the empirical 




2 METHODOLOGY  
 
The Mishkin (1983) test was initially developed to test rational market expectations 
hypotheses in macroeconomics.  The idea underlying the test is that, if the market is 
rational, then it is not possible to obtain abnormal returns from investing in any assets 
based on past information, since all the relevant past information necessary for their 
valuation is incorporated in the current price.  To test this hypothesis, Mishkin (1983) 
proposes comparing the relevant pricing factors of a security at time t with the rational 
one-period-ahead forecasts of these variables. 
 
Extending Pope (2001), we posit a system of n+1 equations, one dealing with pricing 
and n separate forecasting equations.  The forecasting variables are accruals, cash flows, 
and n-2 other posited forecasting variables.  The abnormal returns equation is:  
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ACC,t+1  :  is the firm’s accruals at t+1; 
CF,t+1  :  is the firm’s cash flows at t+1; 
Rt+1  :  is the return on the firm’s stock at t+1; 
E(Rt+1)  :  is the expected return on the firm’s stock at t+1; and 




Equation (1) is just a ‘standard’ abnormal returns equation, where abnormal returns are 
expressed as a function of the unexpected components of accounting and other relevant 
variables.  We include accruals and cash flows because the accruals anomaly context 
allows accruals and cash flows to have separate forecasting ability for earnings (as in 
Pope, 2001).  We include other forecasting variables because prior research in the USA 
documented in Kraft et al (2007) suggests that variables other than accruals and cash 
flow also have forecasting ability for future earnings. 
 
The n ‘true’ forecasting equations then are: 
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with generic forecasting equations for the other variables, Xi, of: 
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 is a row vector with characteristic element i; F is a column vector containing 
the forecasting variables ACC, CF, and Xi, i = 1, …, n-2; a is a column vector with 
characteristic element aj,0; j = 1, …, n; A is an n x n matrix with characteristic element 
aj,k, j, k = 1, …, n; and E is a column vector with characteristic element j. 
 
With rational forecasting (i.e., the ‘market’ uses the ‘true’ forecasting equations in 
forming expectations). Hence, inserting (2) in (1) gives: 
 
                                           11 1 () ' () tt t RE R E        (4) 
 
Thus, rational forecasting suggests that the expected coefficients of the independent 
variables of any regression of  11 () tt R ER     on Ft are zero as long as the elements of   




If equation (1) is an adequate description of how market prices are set, but the market 
mis-forecasts  F using the matrix M in generating expectations about the forecast 
variables, then inserting the mis-forecasted variables into equation (1) produces 
 
                     (5)
 
Hence, the use of incorrect (irrational) forecasts allows for non-zero coefficients for the 
independent variables of any regression of  11 () tt R ER     on Ft  as long as: 
 
                                                      
'() 0 AM     (6) 
 
Nonetheless, in this setting, forecasting irrationality does not imply pricing irrationality 
because: 
 
M A   does not imply 
'() 0 AM     
 
It is the case, however, that: 
 
'() 0 AM M A     
 
'
11 1 () ( ) ' () tt t RE R A M F E           
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Hence, pricing irrationality does imply forecasting irrationality.  Nonetheless, because 
of the complexity of the forecasting equations, an element of 
'() 0 AM    being, say, 
negative (e.g., the coefficient of accruals, as in previous research) does not imply 
specifically how accruals are being used incorrectly to forecast any of the relevant 
variables. 
 
In this paper, we follow a process similar to that in Kraft et al. (2007) and empirically 
test for pricing irrationality by running the following equation: 
 
                                       10 1 , , 2 , , 1
11
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Cj,t  : are  m firm characteristics intended to capture risk. 
 
Our tests for pricing irrationality are that  1, 0, 1,..., i in    .  In equation (7) we 
essentially shift E(Rt+1) to the right hand side and, rather than use abnormal return as the  
dependent variable, we control for risk by adding in independent variables intended to 










One of the advantages of this form of the Mishkin (1983) test is that its implementation 
does not require firms to have earnings information in year t+1.  The two-stage version 
of the Mishkin (1983) test, in which pricing and forecasting equations are estimated 
simultaneously, imposes such a data requirement.  The two-stage process has the 
advantage that specific forecasting inefficiencies can be identified, although the 
estimation process inevitably gets more complex as the number of forecasting variables 
and equations increases.  Nonetheless, as has been observed elsewhere, this requirement 
introduces a forward-looking bias into sample selection by excluding firms that delist in 
the year following the beginning of the returns accumulation period.   
 
3 REGRESSIONS, DATA SOURCES, AND VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
 
Our specific research approach is to first run a restricted version of the regression 
equation (6) with only the risk control variables included as independent variables.  The 
risk control variables we include are: (i) size (Size); (ii) the book-to-market ratio (BM); 
(iii) the ratio of research and development expense to market value (RD); (iv) the 
earnings-to-price ratio (EP); (iv) leverage (Lev); and (vi) the firm’s return in the prior 
eleven months (PastRet).  The inclusion of these variables can be justified by the UK 
evidence reported by Strong and Xu (1997), Liu et al. (1999), Gregory et al. (2001), Al-
Horani et al. (2003), Fama and French (1998), and Dedman et al. (2009).  Then, we add 
in the accruals and cash flow variables (ACC and CF).  Finally, we add in a set of 
additional forecasting variables as in Kraft et al. (2007): (i) sales (SALES); (ii) sales 
growth (SG): (iii) capital expenditures (Capex); and (iv) the growth in capital 




Therefore, the first set of equations estimated are as follows.  We first estimate: 
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Then, we estimate: 
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   (10) 
 
We define accruals and operating cash flows as follows. Calculation of accruals (ACC) 
uses the income statement and balance-sheet approach and follows equation (10): 
 
         ,, , , , , , ,
,
it it it it it it it it
it
ACC CA Cash CL STDebt Div Int Tax
DEP






CA    :  is the change in total current assets (Worldscope datatype wc02201); 
Cash    :  is the change in cash and equivalents (Worldscope datatype wc02001); 
CL    :  is the change in total current liabilities  (Worldscope datatype wc03101); 
STDebt    :  is the change in total short term debt and current portion of long term  
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debt (Worldscope datatype wc03051); 
Div    :  is the change in dividends payable  (Worldscope datatype wc03061); 
Int    :  is the change in interest payable  (Worldscope datatype wc03062); 
Tax    :  is the change in income taxes payable (Worldscope datatype wc03063); 
and 
DEP   : is depreciation, depletion and amortization (Worldscope datatype 
wc01151). 
 
For the earnings (OPINC) measure, we use the Worldscope operating income 
(wc01250) definition.  Cash flows (ACC) are calculated as the difference between 
OPINC and ACC.  All these variables are deflated by the average of beginning and end-
of-year book value of total assets (Worldscope datatype wc02999). 
 
The other variables are defined as below: 
 
Reti,t+1  :  is the annual return of firm i, starting six months after the end of the 
financial year end t; if a company delists during this period it is 
assumed that the following returns are 0; 
Sizei,t  :  is the log of market value of firm i six months after the end of the 
financial year end t; 
BMi,t  :  is the total equity (Worldscope code wc03501) deflated by market 
value for firm i determined six months after the financial year-end t; 
RDi,t    is the total research and development expenses (Worldscope code 
wc01201) deflated by market value for firm i determined six months 
after the financial year-end t; 
EPi,t  :  is the  operating income (Worldscope code wc01250) deflated by 
market value for firm i determined six months after the financial year-
end t; 
PastReti,t  :  is the eleven months cumulative monthly returns starting twelve 
months and ending one month before the month when annual returns  
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start being accumulated for firm i at the financial year-end t; 
Levi,t  :  is total debt (Worldscope code wc03255) deflated by market value for 
firm i determined six months after the financial year-end t; 
Salesi,t  :  is sales (Worldscope code wc01001) deflated by total assets at the 
beginning of year t, for firm i. 
SGi,t  :  is the change in sales deflated by total assets at the beginning of year t, 
for firm i. 
Capexi,t  :  is capital expenditures (Worldscope code wc04601) deflated by total 
assets  at the beginning of year t, for firm i. 
CapexGi,t  :  is the change in capital expenditures deflated by total assets at the 
beginning of year t, for firm i. 
 
As alternative tests not strictly within the Mishkin (1983) test framework developed 
above, we also substitute accruals and cash flow rank dummy variables for the accruals 
and cash flow variables in regression (10).  Such tests can be seen within a general 
approach which suggests rational pricing implies that past accounting data, or 
transformations of such data, should not be able to forecast future abnormal returns.  
Hence, we transform equation (10) by sequentially replacing the accruals and cash flow 
variables by annual decile ranks.  We thus test the following equations: 
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where  ,, it j ACCDEC  and  ,, it j CFDEC  are the accruals and cash flow ranks for firm i at time 
t, respectively.   
 
We adopt two estimation approaches.  The first involves estimating our regressions 
using ordinary least squares estimates of coefficients, and time and firm clustered 
standard errors.  Peterson (2009) and Gow et al. (2010) both suggest the use of clustered 
standard errors in panel data, although the advice is not unequivocal as to the superiority 
of this estimation technique over others.  As a consequence, the second estimation 
approach involves using the standard Fama and MacBeth (1973) approach to estimating 
coefficients and their standard errors.
7  Both estimation techniques, in particular, have 
some capacity to deal with the time effects likely to be present in the data. 
 
To examine the effect of extreme observations on our analyses, we also estimate our 
regressions on two datasets.  The first dataset uses untreated data.  The second dataset 
uses winsorised data, with variables (other than dummy variables) winsorised at the 1% 
and 99% percentile levels. 
 
                                                 
7   We could have opted for the use of a two-way fixed effects model controlling for firm and time 
effects. However, Petersen (2009) warns that, if the observation clustering is not perfect (e.g. non-
constant time or firm effects), using a two-way fixed effects model will still produce biased 
standard errors.  Thus, he advocates a less parametric estimation by calculating standard errors 
clustered by time and firm. This is the option adopted here.  
21 
 
Data used in this paper are derived from three different sources.  Market data (stock 
returns and market value) are retrieved from Datastream, and are complemented by the 
London Share Price Database, which provides delisting reasons, given that this is the 
only source of complete delisting information for the UK stock market.
8  For accounting 
information, Worldscope is used as the data source.  We restrict our analysis to firms 
listed on the London Stock Exchange, listed in £GBP, that are non-financial firms 
(Datastream  ICBIC datatype different from 8000), and have information in both 
Datastream and Worldscope for the financial years of 1990-2007.  The final sample is 




We start our analysis by providing a description of the sample in Table 1 in terms of 
how annually ranking firms by accruals is associated with the independent variables 






Consistent with Soares and Stark (2009), who use data from 1989 to 2004, ranking 
firms by accruals produces a negative association with operating cash flows and annual 
returns.  With respect to the measures we use to capture risk effects, accruals rankings 
                                                 
8   When a stock's death assigned by LSPD is 7, 14, 16, 20 or 21, the return for the delisting month 
is considered to be -1 and the market value is set to missing subsequently.  
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have an inverted U-shaped relationship with Size, BM and EP, again consistent with 
Soares and Stark (2009).  Regarding PastRet, whilst not completely monotonic, there 
seems to be a positive relation with accruals deciles. The relationship with Lev, although 
unclear to a certain extent, appears to be an inverted U-shaped.  It is only with RD that a 
relatively clearcut relationship exists, if confined primarily to the lower numbered 
accruals deciles, with the relationship being negative.   
 
Table 1 suggests other possibilities for the accruals effects found in Soares and Stark 
(2009), however.  Although accruals rankings appear to have a U-shaped relationships 
with Sales, and with CapexG, they do appear to have a broadly positive relationship 
with SG and a negative relationship with Capex, although the results for accruals decile 
10 are in contradiction to this general trend.  As a consequence, apparent accruals mis-
pricing effects could also be related to a failure to control for variables that could help 






In Table 2 we provide Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefficients between the 
variables that are used in the paper.  There is little evidence of sizable correlations 
between the variables specifically of interest in this study (ACC and CF) and the other 
independent variables.  As a consequence, it is unlikely that multicollinearity will be a 
problem for our estimated regressions. Additionally, the magnitude of the Spearmen 
correlation coefficients is sometimes different when compared with the results reported  
23 
 
for the Pearson correlation coefficients. This hints at the possibility of extreme 







Table 3 provides the results of estimating equations (8) to (10).  Panel A provides 
estimates on both raw and winsorised data using OLS coefficients with time and firm 
clustered standard errors.  Panel B provides coefficient and standard error estimates 
using the Fama and MacBeth (1973) approach.  Coefficients that are significant at the 
5% level, using a two-tailed test, are represented in bold type.  Coefficients that are 
significant at the 10% level, using a two-tailed test, are represented in italicised type.  
Equations (9) and (10) represent Mishkin (1983) tests.   
 
When dealing with raw data, the picture is straightforward.   For the results using OLS 
coefficients and time and firm clustered standard errors, there are no significant 
coefficients, whether they be risk control variables, accruals or cash flow variables, or 
additional forecasting variables.  When using the Fama and MacBeth (1973) approach, 
neither accruals nor cash flow have significant coefficients.  Further, none of the 
additional forecasting variables are significant.  The ratio of research and development 
expenditures is significant for all model specifications, with past returns becoming more 




The picture is much changed when winsorised data are used.  First, for the results using 
OLS coefficients and time and firm clustered standard errors, some of the risk control 
variables become significant.  In particular, the ratio of research and development 
expenditures is significant for all model specifications.  The ratio of earnings to price 
and the ratio of book to market are significant in particular specifications, with the 
latter, whilst only significant at the 10% level for equations (8) and (9), significant at the 
5% level for equation (10).  One of the additional forecasting variables, capital 
expenditure growth, has a significant and negative coefficient at the 5% level, with sales 
growth having a negative coefficient which is significant at the 10% level.  With respect 
to the variables of interest, the accruals variable stays insignificant, but the cash flow 
variable now has a significantly positive relationship with returns, whether it is equation 
(9) or (10) being estimated. 
 
When using the Fama and Macbeth (1973) approach, the picture is similar.  More risk 
control variables become significant (past returns and the earnings to price ratio become 
consistently significant, along with leverage becoming significant at at least the 10% 
level in all equations, with the book to market ratio ceasing to have significant 
explanatory power).  Sales growth loses significance, even at the 10% level.  But, the 
accruals variable still does not have a significant coefficient, and the cash flow 
coefficient is significant and positive, whether it is equation (9) or (10) being estimated.    
 
What the results in Table 3 do suggest is that, if winsorised data are employed, there is a 
cash flow effect on annual returns.  This result is robust to whether or not additional 
earnings forecasting variables are included.  This suggests that, if there is an effect 
associated with earnings components on annual returns, it is due to the cash flow  
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component.  Further, it is incremental to a general earnings effect captured by EP.  As 
pointed out earlier, however, it is not possible to conclude from these estimations if the 
cash flow effect is caused by any mis-forecasting with respect to cash flows specifically.  
Further, an alternative explanation is that the cash flow effect is caused by risk. 
 
Overall, the results also contrast with those in Pincus et al. (2007), who find an accruals 
effect but no cash flow effect on UK data when ignoring the effect of trading costs.  
They use a number of methodologies.  The first one involves a two-stage Mishkin test.  
The second one involves a methodology similar to the one here, although with fewer 
controls for risk.  In particular, whilst they control for Size, BM and EP, they do not 
include controls for RD, PastRet and Lev.  The failure to control for these other firm 
characteristics which do help explain returns to one extent or another in our sample 
could account for the difference in results.   
 
Finally, there is some evidence of the additional forecasting variables being mis-priced.  
Nonetheless, the only consistently significant relationship, whichever estimation 
approach is used, is a negative one for growth in capital expenditure when using 
winsorised data. 
 
To check the robustness of the results to alternative specifications of the accruals and 
cash flow variables, we additionally estimate equations (12) and (13).  In these 
equations, we first substitute for ACC nine dummy variables corresponding to accruals 
rank deciles two through ten in equation (9).  Second, we substitute for CF nine dummy 
variables corresponding to cash flow rank deciles two through ten.  We maintain the 
presence of the risk control variables and the other forecasting variables.  The results are  
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shown in Table 4, with only the results for the accruals and cash flow variables being 
reported.  The results for the risk variables and additional forecasting variables have the 






When considering the impact of accruals decile rank dummies, if raw data are used, the 
results are similar to those found in Soares and Stark (2009) for annual returns, 
whichever estimation method is used.  The coefficients of accruals rank deciles seven 
(nine to ten) to ten are negative and are individually significant at a 5% level if OLS 
coefficients and time and firm clustered standard errors (the Fama and MacBeth, 1973, 
approach) are used.  The coefficient of accruals decile rank six (seven and eight) is 
negative and significant at the 10% level.  The coefficient of cash flow is negative and 
significant if OLS coefficients and time and firm clustered standard errors are used, 
whereas it is negative and insignificant if the Fama and MacBeth (1973) approach is 
employed.   
 
If winsorised data are used, however, none of the accruals decile rank dummies are 
significant, whichever estimation approach is employed.
9   Further, as in Table 3, a 
significantly positive coefficient for cash flow is estimated, again whichever estimation 
approach is adopted. 
                                                 
9    An F-test suggests that the accruals decile rank dummies do jointly and significantly add 




When cash flow decile rank dummies are used, a significant, but positive, coefficient for 
the accruals variable is observed when using raw data, but this result is not consistent 
across estimation approaches.  When winsorised data are used, neither estimation 
approach produces a significant coefficient for the accruals variable.  For both sets of 
data, there is a generally positive, if not monotonic, trend in the coefficients of the cash 
flow decile dummies as the cash flow decile ranks move from low to high.  For both 
sets of data, however, none of the cash flow decile dummy coefficients are significant 
when OLS coefficients and time and firm clustered standard errors are employed.   
When, the Fama and MacBeth (1973) approach is used, there are no significant 
coefficients when raw data are used, but cash flow decile rank dummies six through ten 
are positive and significant at the 5% level  when winsorised data are used.
10   
 
Overall, there is little evidence for an accruals mis-pricing effect in which returns 
decline as accruals increase, once an extended set of risk controls are taken into account.  
In fact, there is stronger evidence suggesting that, in fact, there is a cash flow effect in 
annual returns, even after risk controls have been taken into account.  As indicated 
above, however, an alternative interpretation is that the accruals effect is not a separate 
effect, once the effects of other variables considered to predict future returns and/or 
future earnings are taken into account, whereas the cash flow effect is separate.   
   
                                                 
10   When raw data are used, note that the coefficient of the cash flow decile rank two dummy is 
negative and fairly large, suggesting that the average returns for that decile are lower than those 





In this paper, we apply a modified one-stage version of the Mishkin (1983) test to 
companies in the UK stock market in order to investigate the presence or otherwise of 
the accruals anomaly in UK firms’ annual returns.  We apply the test using an expanded 
set of risk controls, relative to prior research, that have been found to have the ability to 
predict returns in the UK.   
 
For the period of 1990-2007, we report that there is little evidence of a general accruals 
anomaly in the UK, in which accruals have a negative relationship with future returns, 
once risk and other potential forecasting forecasting variables have been accounted for.  
We also provide evidence that, after winsorising extreme observations, evidence of a 
cash flow anomaly is found for the UK stock market.  We also find some evidence in 
favour of an anomaly with respect to capital expenditure growth.  An alternative 
interpretation of our results is that there is no separate accruals effect once other effects 
are taken into account, but there is a separate cash flow effect, and a capital expenditure 
growth effect as well.   
 
Whether the cash flow and capital expenditure growth effects are evidence of actual 
anomalies is an interesting issue.  One other possibility is that they capture elements of 
risk not captured by the risk controls employed.  .If such an explanation is accepted, our 
results can be interpreted as suggesting the possibility of, for example, a conditional 
capital asset pricing model, in which quite a number of firm characteristics act as 
conditioning variables.  Should this be the case, it suggests that empirical asset pricing 
models need to be fairly complex to capture the effects of conditioning variables in  
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generating estimates of abnormal returns.  Investigating this possibility is a potentially 
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The Associations Between Ranking Firms By Accruals and the Independent Variables 
 
AccDec ACC CF  Ret Size BM  EP  PastRet RD  Lev  Sales  SG  Capex  CapexG 
1  -0.285 0.138 0.178 9.732 0.286 -0.237 0.071 0.033 0.694 1.847 0.435 0.121 0.045 
2  -0.130 0.133 0.153  10.481  0.557 -0.037 0.100 0.025 0.713 1.465 0.108 0.099 0.021 
3  -0.091 0.121 0.097  10.952  0.707 0.012 0.115 0.017 0.636 1.594 0.296 0.086 0.012 
4  -0.066 0.119 0.123  11.277  0.649 0.053 0.105 0.017 0.839 1.397 0.118 0.095 0.025 
5  -0.048 0.107 0.108  11.419  0.712 0.064 0.115 0.019 0.724 1.383 0.138 0.078 0.014 
6  -0.032 0.091 0.108  11.475  0.640 0.082 0.118 0.015 0.546 1.295 0.144 0.074 -0.005 
7  -0.015 0.072 0.074  11.183  0.836 -0.017 0.097 0.044 0.572 1.218 0.113 0.072 0.011 
8  0.005 0.053 0.081  10.958  0.746 0.051 0.111 0.021 0.415 1.376 0.219 0.064 0.009 
9  0.041 0.005 0.061  10.629  0.559 0.063 0.146 0.015 0.581 1.597 0.268 0.074 0.020 
10  0.347 -0.338 0.042  10.269  0.340 0.044 0.203 0.014 0.450 3.039 1.549 0.114 0.062 







Pearson (Lower Diagonal) and Spearman (Upper Diagonal) Correlations Between Independent Variables 
 
   ACC  CF  Ret  Size  BM  EP  PastRet  RD  Lev  Sales  SG  Capex  CapexG 
ACC     -0.454 -0.041 0.061 0.015 0.145  0.047  -0.033 -0.053 0.062 0.209 -0.046  0.088 
CF  -0.993     0.150 0.323 -0.161 0.456  0.225  -0.030 -0.027 0.307 0.110 0.286  0.046 
Ret  0.007 -0.009      0.079 0.067 0.154  0.102  0.009  0.023 0.052 -0.037 0.028  -0.047 
Size  -0.002  0.035 -0.031     -0.274  0.207 0.318 0.130  -0.053  0.007  0.128 0.262  0.120 
BM  -0.001 0.003 0.001 -0.046     0.235 -0.281 -0.093  0.314  -0.179  -0.220  -0.081 -0.102 
EP  0.004  0.015  -0.001  0.101 -0.304     0.065  -0.091 0.321 0.298 0.115 0.184  0.016 
PastRet  0.000 0.006 -0.009 0.152 -0.037 0.044     -0.033 -0.207 0.114  0.143  0.062  0.074 
RD  -0.001 -0.006 -0.003 -0.045 0.264 -0.928  -0.025     -0.093 -0.112 -0.074 -0.031  -0.021 
Lev  -0.001 0.000 -0.007 -0.072 -0.242 -0.106  -0.045  0.079     0.014 -0.126 0.027  -0.101 
Sales  0.000  0.003  0.001 -0.004 -0.006 0.006  0.006  -0.003 -0.004      0.434 0.207  0.114 
SG  0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.002 0.001  0.003  -0.001  -0.002 0.996     0.268 0.278 
Capex  -0.002 0.000 -0.022 0.011 -0.002 0.002  0.006  -0.005 -0.006 0.261 0.264     0.449 
CapexG  0.000 -0.002 -0.022 0.005 -0.002 0.001  0.010  -0.002 -0.007 0.246 0.248 0.921    






Risk Control and Single-Stage Mishkin (1983) Test Results 
                                            
   Risk Characteristics  Main Variables  Other Control Variables  Adj R
2 F-test 
   Size BM EP  PastRet RD Lev ACC CF Sales SG  Capex  CapexG     
Panel A: Clustered standard errors                         
Raw  -0.012  -0.001  -0.008  -0.004  -0.027  -0.002                    0.001    
(0.264)  (0.818)  (0.895)  (0.861)  (0.861)  (0.297)                         
                     
Winsorised  -0.002  0.033  0.161  0.046  0.715  -0.002                    0.011    
(0.745)  (0.058)  (0.026)  (0.195)  (0.005)  (0.901)                         
                
Raw  -0.012 -0.001 -0.007 -0.004 -0.024 -0.001 -0.007 -0.009                  0.001     
(0.154) (0.797) (0.892) (0.861) (0.852) (0.228)  (0.954)  (0.937)                   
                    
Winsorised  -0.008  0.031  0.071 0.041 0.832  -0.008 -0.012 0.298              0.020    
(0.161)  (0.069)  (0.238) (0.231) (0.000)  (0.578) (0.853) (0.000)                   
                
Raw  -0.011 -0.001 -0.008 -0.004 -0.026 -0.001 -0.013 -0.016 0.009 -0.008 -0.015 -0.024 0.001  4.500 
(0.181) (0.831) (0.877) (0.854) (0.835) (0.246) (0.909) (0.891) (0.438) (0.460) (0.677) (0.533)      (0.001) 
                        
Winsorised  -0.006  0.031  0.067 0.044  0.82  -0.012 0.014 0.275  0.017  -0.05  0.154  -0.532  0.025 4.578 






Table 3 (cont'd) 
 
Risk Control and Single-Stage Mishkin (1983) Test Results 
                
   Risk Characteristics  Main Variables  Other Control Variables  Adj R
2 F-test 
   Size BM EP  PastRet RD Lev ACC CF Sales SG  Capex  CapexG     
Panel B: Fama-MacBeth                           
Raw  -0.013 -0.017 0.023  0.043  0.536  -0.002                    0.039    
(0.213) (0.503) (0.696) (0.115) (0.009)  (0.829)                         
                 
Winsorised  -0.004 0.021 0.125 0.069 0.790 -0.019                    0.048    
(0.536) (0.124) (0.007) (0.013) (0.004) (0.096)                         
                  
Raw  -0.010 -0.013 0.043  0.050  0.498  -0.001  -0.143  -0.084              0.052    
(0.199) (0.542) (0.282) (0.066)  (0.009)  (0.869)  (0.160)  (0.589)                   
                  
Winsorised  -0.006 0.019 0.095 0.067 0.819 -0.022  -0.061  0.151              0.058    
(0.246) (0.170) (0.012) (0.017) (0.002) (0.045) (0.418)  (0.019)                   
                
Raw  -0.009 -0.012 0.042  0.054 0.500 -0.002 -0.150 -0.091 0.004 -0.002 0.027 -0.230 0.059 1.187 
(0.215) (0.562) (0.304) (0.048) (0.010) (0.845) (0.154) (0.567) (0.595) (0.763) (0.816) (0.106)      (0.352) 
                   
Winsorised  -0.005 0.020 0.091 0.066 0.797 -0.025  -0.058  0.143  0.008 -0.022 -0.007 -0.29  0.068 4.923 
(0.326) (0.130) (0.014) (0.017) (0.003) (0.023) (0.492)  (0.024)  (0.366) (0.152) (0.930) (0.002)     (0.008) 
Notes:  p-values in parenthesis.  Bold type indicates significance at the 5% level or better.  Italicised type indicates significance at the 10% level but not the 5% level.  The F-test results 






Cash Flow and Accruals Decile Effects on Annual Returns 
 
   ACCDEC2 ACCDEC3 ACCDEC4 ACCDEC5 ACCDEC6 ACCDEC7 ACCDEC8 ACCDEC9 ACCDEC10 CF  Adj  R
2 
Panel A: Clustered standard errors 
Raw  -0.016  -0.066  -0.036 -0.049 -0.049  -0.085 -0.082 -0.107 -0.131 -0.004  0.003 
(0.509)  (0.052)  (0.252) (0.134) (0.081)  (0.044) (0.035) (0.002) (0.000) (0.006)    
              
Winsorised  0.022 -0.003 0.024 0.018 0.019 0.002 0.006 0.000 0.016 0.274  0.025 
(0.168) (0.868) (0.353) (0.469) (0.396) (0.950) (0.843) (0.987) (0.612) (0.000)    
 
Panel B: Fama-MacBeth 
Raw  -0.015 -0.055 -0.027 -0.050 -0.041 -0.075 -0.081 -0.107 -0.146 -0.124 0.067 
(0.613) (0.112) (0.380) (0.195) (0.250) (0.096) (0.094) (0.042) (0.027) (0.433)    
              
Winsorised  0.018 -0.007 0.015 -0.003 0.006 -0.015 -0.020 -0.028 -0.038 0.113  0.075 






Table 4 (cont'd) 
 
Accruals and Cash Flow Decile Effects on Annual Returns 
 
   ACC  CFDEC2 CFDEC3 CFDEC4 CFDEC5 CFDEC6 CFDEC7 CFDEC8 CFDEC9  CFDEC10  Adj  R
2 
Panel C: Clustered standard errors 
Raw  0.003  -0.072  -0.003  -0.015  -0.014 0.031 0.044 0.044 0.038 0.083  0.003 
(0.000)  (0.410) (0.964) (0.874) (0.879) (0.742) (0.629) (0.609) (0.652) (0.294)     
              
Winsorised  -0.092  -0.008 0.030 0.017 0.015 0.048 0.064 0.058 0.055 0.092  0.021 
(0.363) (0.822) (0.509) (0.767) (0.779) (0.449) (0.318) (0.360) (0.395) (0.162)     
 
Panel D: Fama-MacBeth 
Raw  -0.038  -0.062 0.014 0.005 -0.002 0.035 0.042 0.036 0.032 0.065  0.063 
(0.511) (0.382) (0.793) (0.935) (0.977) (0.621) (0.552) (0.628) (0.643) (0.363)     
               
Winsorised  -0.037 0.013 0.060  0.056 0.053 0.083 0.099 0.092 0.089 0.119  0.075 
(0.664) (0.646) (0.072)  (0.133) (0.139) (0.044) (0.021) (0.038) (0.028) (0.005)    
Notes:  p-values in parenthesis.  Bold type indicates significance at the 5% level or better.  Italicised type indicates significance at the 10% level but not the 5% level.
 
 